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In the 1990s, the privatisation of government service provision has become 
increasingly common in Australia. The approach taken by Australian policy-makers to 
the privatisation of government services has been dominated by the ‘pure market’ 
model of competitive tendering, with little recognition that this model may be 
inappropriate under circumstances, such as severe performance specification and 
measurement difficulties, which are quite commonplace in the public sector. 
Competitive tendering for the delivery of outcomes rather than outputs enjoys some 
favour in this context. A case study of government service privatisation based upon 
contracting for outcomes is considered. This case study (of employment assistance) 
helps to clarify some of the problems of outcome-based contracting.  
 
Please note that this paper was prepared and presented in August 1998, and that the 
employment assistance case study represented a preliminary review of issues arising 
from a scheme which was at that stage very new. Since that time, the Government has 
made major changes to the system, in part along the lines suggested by the analysis in 
the paper. For example, a ‘floor’ or minimum bid price has been introduced, so as to 
prevent the lodging of unsustainably cheap bids. However, it is also the case that 
considerable further data on the performance of the new system has become available, 
and it should be noted that no attempt has been made here to analyse that data. 
 Introduction 
 
This paper discusses recent Australian policy and experience with the privatisation of 
government services. ‘Privatisation’ is for the purposes of this paper taken to refer to 
the transfer to private entities of responsibility for the production of final services 
which were previously produced by government, while the term ‘government 
services’ is construed to refer to final services which are funded wholly or primarily 
by government rather than by the consumer. 
 
Internationally within the public sector, the rise of economic liberalism has given rise 
to a desire to maximise the role of ‘market’-type mechanisms and to commensurately 
reduce reliance upon hierarchical controls as an organisational principle (OECD, 
1993). Australia is certainly no exception to this. The US ‘reinventing government’ 
movement has also been influential in Australia, although the British public sector 
reform model has had even more impact not only by way of direct influence, but 
also as refracted through New Zealand practice (Schick, 1996; Boston et al, 1996). 
The concept of the purchaser/provider split is particularly fashionable within the 
Australian public sector at present. Australia has also been swept up in the current 
wave of international enthusiasm for outsourcing. The privatisation of government 
services is, of course, the most comprehensive form of outsourcing, in that it contracts 
out not merely inputs in the production process, but entire production processes. 
 
The current wave of Australian enthusiasm for the privatisation of government 
services is largely a phenomenon of the 1990s. It is useful here to distinguish between 
service privatisations in which the contractor constructs and owns a substantial 
specialised asset (ie an asset with a large sunk cost), and those which do not. The first 
of these types of service privatisation represent a form of what is sometimes referred 
to as BOO (build-own-operate) contracting
1 . 
 
Australian has seen a number of BOO service privatisation in recent years. In 1992, 
the first privately-owned for profit ‘public hospital’ was opened at Port Macquarie in 
NSW, under a twenty year service contract with the State Government (Collyer, 
1997). Victoria employed the same contracting model for a new regional hospital in 
the Latrobe Valley opened in 1997, and has since then called for expressions of 
interest by private interested in purchasing and operating a major existing public 
hospital (Bachelard, 1998). The Port Macquarie project was subjected in 1996 to a 
devastating critique by the NSW Auditor-General, who found that public officials had 
failed to negotiate a satisfactory deal, and that the Government was essentially paying 
twice for a facility which it would never ultimately own (NSW Auditor-General, 
1996). 
 
BOO projects have been partially driven, particularly at the state level, by a desire to 
avoid the public borrowing implicit in government provision. The 1990s have seen the 
rise in Australia of crude anti-public debt doctrines, with the adoption of debt 
elimination as a principle of fiscal strategy by a number of state governments and 
subsequently by the federal government (Robinson, 1996a). These anti-debt doctrines 
have given both BOO service privatisation and the sale of government business 
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enterprises an additional, albeit illusory, appeal to debt-obsessed governments. In the 
case of the states, this has been reinforced by the undue restrictiveness of federally-
imposed borrowing constraints. 
 
BOO projects probably represent, however, only a fraction of the rapidly increasing 
range of government service privatisations in Australia. Within the broader class of 
such privatisations a particularly interesting example is employment assistance, which 
is the case study discussed below. Another example is technical and further education 
(TAFE). Following an intergovernmental agreement in 1992, TAFE services which 
were formerly produced within government educational institutions have been 
progressively opened to competitive tendering, with private sector training bodies 
playing an increasingly important role (ANTA, 1997; Kell, Balatti and Muspratt, 
1997). A primary aim of these reforms has been to make the industrial training system 
less ‘supply driven’ and more ‘demand driven’ (Moran, 1996). As of 1988, all public 
training funding is paid to providers chosen by consumers, under a so-called ‘user 
choice’ mechanism (Kemp, 1997). 
 
Local government has been a sector in which service privatisation started relatively 
early and has proceeded relatively far. As in the US, the privatisation of relatively 
straightforward areas such as garbage collection was widespread well before the 
1990s. More recently, however, privatisation has spread to more novel areas. In the 
State of Victoria, for example, under the duress of compulsory competitive tendering 
policies enforced by the State Government, the management of municipal libraries has 
in a number of instances been privatised.  
 
Another area of extensive service privatisation in Australia has been prisons (Moyle, 
1994; Harding, 1997. The first private prison opened in 1990 at Borallon in the State 
of Queensland, and since then an increasing number have been established throughout 
the country. In Queensland and NSW, government has sensibly retained ownership of 
the asset and has consequently confined privatisation to relatively short-term 
management contracts. Victoria, by contrast, has chosen what is essentially the BOO 
path, with the government consequently committed to twenty year service contracts 
(Victorian Government, 1996: 88). Australian experience with privatised prisons is 
rather mixed. Some (such as Borallon) have apparently operated reasonably well. 
Others have experienced serious performance difficulties. Perhaps the worst problems 
have been experienced in Victoria, where the new Port Phillip private prison has 
experienced high suicide rates, riots and a range of other serious problems. 
Inadequacies in the performance monitoring regime appear at least partly to blame. 
 
The Market Model 
 
The current Australian ‘conventional wisdom’ about the privatisation of government 
services is characterised by, firstly, a pervasive belief that there are few if any limits to 
the appropriate extent of such privatisation and, secondly, by an adherence to a very 
particular model of how it should occur. 
 
Advocates of the notion that government should largely remove itself from the 
production of the services which it funds are spread widely throughout the 
bureaucracy and within the Coalition, and are also to be found within the Labor Party.   4
The National Commission of Audit, which in 1996 produced a blueprint for public 
sector reform at the behest the incoming Howard Government, affirmed that 
‘governments as far as possible should operate as funders of programs, with funding 
separate from the actual delivery of the services involved’ (Officer, 1996: viii), and 
one influential Coalition-aligned political consultant has even announced the arrival of 
an era of ‘virtual government’ (Sturgess, 1994: 45). By contrast, amongst those who 
sense that that there major limits to the privatisation of government services, there 
tends to be an inability to adequately articulate the nature of those limits. 
 
The model of contracting upon which Australian enthusiasts of government service 
privatisation and of marketisation more generally base their thinking is one which 
involves the government contracting with provider entities for the supply of clearly 
defined goods or services at a specified price. The idea is that by focusing on 
deliverables, the contract should free government of any concern with the inputs and 
processes to be used by the provider. Supply arrangement, it is held, should be as 
competitive as possible. This will generally mean that a transparent competitive 
tendering process should be employed to select the provider, and that re-tendering 
should occur at relatively frequent intervals so as to maximise competitive pressure 
(eg Industry Commission, 1996; Reith, 1996; Queensland Treasury, 1996; FitzGerald, 
1996, vol 1, pp 65-68). The only generally acknowledged (partial) exception to this 
model in current Australian public sector practice is in the case of BOO-type projects, 
where the long-run nature of the capital investment obviously makes long-term 
operating contracts unavoidable. 
 
While this model does not necessarily rule out tendering by non-profit entities, the 
emphasis is upon harnessing the profit motive to drive performance, rather than upon 
drawing upon the altruism of community-minded individuals and organisations. 
 
This model of the purchaser/provider transaction gives maximum play to the 
competitive price mechanism, and may be referred to as the ‘pure market’ model. It 
represents a form of what the organisational economist Oliver Williamson refers to as 
‘classical’ contracting. The obvious inspiration of the pure market model is 
elementary economics. It has, however, obvious synergies with the idea of 
management focused upon outputs and outcomes rather than inputs an idea which 




Two closely-related central issues arise. Firstly, to what extent and under what 
circumstances is the pure market model feasible and effective mode of contracting 
between government and private sector service providers?  Secondly, what if 
any are the limits to service privatisation? 
 
Organisational economics points to two important criteria for determining whether a 
particular transaction is well suited to ‘pure market’ contracting. One of these is asset 
specificity, and the other is the existence and severity of performance specification 
                                                 
2   ‘Outputs’, of course,  refer to the actual services provided, whereas ‘outcomes’ refers to the intended 
result of providing those outputs. In a standard example, a measles vaccination in an output, whereas a 
reduced incidence of measles is an outcome.   5
and measurement problems (Williamson, 1985)
3. Asset specificity takes a number of 
forms, including specificity of physical assets of the type referred to above in respect 
to BOO projects. In terms of performance specification and measurement, if the type 
and quality of the service to be provided can be clearly specified in the contract, and 
provider compliance with the terms of the contract is, consequently, capable of 
unambiguous verification without undue cost, then there are no performance 
measurement/specification impediments to ‘pure’ market contracting. There are 
certainly a variety of government services which meet these criteria, and which are 
consequently well-suited to classic competitive tendering
4. Garbage collection and 
franchised bus routes are two good examples. It is, however, well known that severe 
output specification and measurement problems are particularly widespread within the 
public sector. The greater the magnitude of such problems, the more scope there is for 
potential suppliers to misrepresent the quality of the service they are offering to 
provide and then, having won a contract, to compromise quality and get away with it. 
Profit-maximising contractors may have incentives to behave in this manner even in 
the absence of fierce competition. A climate of intense price competition may, 
however, force them to cut costs by sacrificing quality in order to keep in business. In 
respect to certain government services, moreover, central Government may not know 
which precise outputs are needed to achieve the outcomes it has in mind. Acute 
hospital services are a classic example. Employment assistance (see below) is seen by 
Australian government policy-makers as another. 
 
One implication of these informational problems is simply that in many instances 
internal production will be more efficient than outsourcing. As Williamson points out 
(1985: 154-5), internal production has a number of advantages including more 
effective performance monitoring and greater flexibility of contractual adaptation. In 
the absence of serious performance measurement difficulties (or asset specificity 
problems) come into play, these advantages of internal production will be offset by the 
motivating power of market performance incentives but not otherwise. 
 
A further implication is that, if outsourcing is to take place, the competitive tendering 
model will in many instances not be the best contractual modus operandi. Both 
theoretical considerations and US experience (Propper, 1993; DeHoog, 1990; Mann, 
McMillin, Rienzi and Eviston, 1995; Milward, 1994; Kettl, 1993) indicate that, in the 
presence of serious performance specification/measurement problems, both purchaser 
and provider a strong interest in maintaining continuity in the relationships rather than 
transacting their business as a series of no-commitment competitive tendering ‘one 
night stands’. One reason for this is that it the true quality of a provider can often only 
be judged after the efflux of some time, giving government a strong incentive to retain 
the services of any provider whom it has come to believe may be relied upon to do a 
good job. When, moreover, new providers must climb a ‘learning curve’ in order to 
attain full competence in providing the service concerned, this need for continuity is 
reinforced by a form of human asset specificity. Moreover, notwithstanding the 
fashionable rhetoric about the desirability of focusing exclusively upon outputs and/or 
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outcomes, the presence of significant specification/measurement problems often 
means that it makes sense for government to interest itself in the inputs and processes 
employed by the supplier, as proxies for quality (eg Mann, McMillin, Rienzi and 
Eviston, 1995). 
 
One idea which has become fashionable in recent times in Australia is the notion that, 
by contracting for the delivery of outcomes rather than outputs, it may be possible to 
overcome some of these contracting difficulties. Perhaps the boldest Australian 
experiment with outcome-based funding is taking place at present in the privatised 
provision of employment assistance. 
 
Privatisation of Employment Assistance 
 
‘Employment assistance’ refers to jobs information/matching services and to other 
labour market programs designed to assist unemployed people into jobs and off 
government income support. Traditionally, employment assistance in Australia was 
provided predominantly by a government body, the Commonwealth Employment 
Service (CES), with some funding of services provided by non-profit private sector 
bodies. In 1998, a radically new ‘FLEX’ scheme initiated by the Coalition 
Government  has come into operation, as the central part of a so-called Job Network 
scheme (Vanstone, 1996). Under FLEX, all service provision is awarded by 
competitive tender including any market share which might be won by a new 
government service provider, Employment National. Approximately seventy percent 
of work has gone in the first contract period to private sector providers, from both for-
profit and non-profit sectors (Trinca, 1998; Dore, 1998). Another key feature of the 
scheme is considerable client choice of provider. 
 
Three categories of assistance are provided under FLEX: Job Matching, Job Search 
Training, and Intensive Assistance. Intensive Assistance is a catch-all for a range of 
forms of assistance which may be provided to the long-term unemployed
5, including 
various types of remedial training, psychological assistance, and, at least in principle, 
temporary wage subsidy arrangements (DEETYA, 1997c: 81). 
 
The FLEX scheme was not the first step in the privatisation of employment assistance. 
In the early 1990s, the then Labor Government had introduced the principle of ‘case 
management’ into employment assistance for the long-term unemployed. Case 
management is a health sector concept, and involves each client being assigned to a 
case manager who manages their case and selects the services with which they are 
provided. Initially, this function was carried out exclusively by the CES. In 1994, 
Labor decided to open case management services to what it described as ‘healthy 
competition’ from the private sector (Keating, 1994). This system commenced 
operation in 1995, and was still in its infancy when it was superseded by FLEX. 
 
The influence of the pure market model upon the design of FLEX is pervasive. The 
emphasis is strongly upon price competition. Job Matching
6 and Job Search Training 
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also eligible for Intensive Assistance services. 
6    Apart from the outcomes component of the payment, which is (initially at least) fixed.   7
contracts have been awarded on a ‘price-competitive basis’, which means that bids are 
first judged to be either ‘suitable’ or unsuitable, and those judged suitable are then  
‘ranked according to price’ (DEETYA, 1997c: 4). Although the Government has set 
fixed prices for Intensive Assistance in the first tender round, this arrangement is 
purely transitional. From the second tender round, all services are to be tendered on a 
‘price-competitive basis’ (DEETYA, 1997a: 11). The duration of the contract is also 
relatively short: eighteen months in the initial round, with an expectation of 
approximately three years in the second round and beyond. 
 
This move towards a system based primarily upon price competition represents a step 
into the unknown. Under the previous case management system, prices had been fixed 
by government and tender competition was confined to quality. This was widely 
viewed as a temporary arrangement, but there was in fact inter-departmental 
controversy about how far and in what manner price competition should be developed 
within the case management system (Auditor General, 1996b). This controversy was 
clearly related to the existence of substantial ex ante quality measurement difficulties 
(Auditor General, 1996a), and to the presence of a significant ‘learning curve’ effect 
amongst providers (ESRA, 1997: 40, 44). 
 
Also consistent with the model of pure market contracting is a major reduction in the 
input and process regulations governing provider agencies under FLEX (Stuart and 
Thorsen, 1997). By way of comparison, the case management scheme had been 
managed on the premise that ‘competitive tendering alone would be insufficient to 
produce speedy improvements in quality and performance’ (ESRA, 1997: 12). Case 
management providers were therefore subject to a series of health sector-inspired 
quality assurance measures, including an accreditation process and a ‘practice 
improvement program’ (ESRA, 1997: 22, 33-35). Under FLEX the accreditation 
process has been abolished, and quality-related process requirements have been 
limited to privacy matters and complaints handling. There is a Code of Conduct for 
providers (DEETYA, 1997b: 51), but it is for the most part highly general in nature. 
This is perhaps hardly surprising given that the Code was not part of the original 
scheme design, but was added subsequently to counter public criticism of the abolition 
of accreditation requirements (Senate, 1997, 3.39-3.43). 
 
The most striking feature of this new scheme is that provider remuneration is quite 
heavily weighted to outcomes. Intensive Assistance is the most cost-intensive service, 
and potential provider remuneration-per-case (of up to approximately $9,000) reflects 
this. Sixty-five percent of this potential remuneration is contingent upon outcomes, 
meaning that this amount is payable to providers only if and when an eligible client 
(basically an unemployed persons who is in receipt of government income support) is 
placed in a job. The remaining thirty-five percent taking the form of an ‘up-front’ 
payment (DEETYA, 1997c: 13). Previously extant government-funded labour market 
programs have been abolished, as a consequence of which the government now no 
longer produces or purchases the specific outputs which comprise Intensive 
Assistance
7. The provider agencies both select and pay for whatever services they 
provide to clients either producing those services themselves, or purchasing them 
from others. The only constraint on the freedom of provider agencies to choose 
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whatever services they believe are most appropriate for the client is a requirement that 
the provider agency enter an ‘activity agreement’ with each client in which the 
services to be provided to that client and that an official of the relevant Government 
department approve that agreement (DEETYA, 1997b: 28-9). 
 
Payments for Job Matching are, similarly, comprised of an outcomes component and 
an up-front component. The outcomes component was fixed in the first round by the 
Government at $250. The up-front component has been the subject of (aggressive) 
price competition, and information about the per-case amounts tendered by successful 
bidders is commercial-in-confidence. Industry sources suggest, however, that the 
average may be around $200, with some perhaps as low as $100. The resultant heavy 
weighting of outcomes in Job Matching remuneration would, therefore, appear to be 
in part the consequence of a tendering framework which placed too much emphasis 
upon price and too little upon quality, permitting some rather dubious operations to 
win business at low prices. 
 
Only in respect to the Job Search Training element of FLEX has there been no attempt 
to place remuneration on an outcomes basis. Agencies are paid per episode of training 
(ie on an output basis), although subsequent success in job placement the Job 
Matching outcome payment. 
 
The Rationale for Focusing upon Outcomes 
 
Why the extent of this emphasis upon outcomes, and corresponding de-control of 
outputs?  Clearly, there are significant quality specification and measurement 
problems which would need to be addressed if government contracted with provider 
agencies to provide outputs
8. However, in respect to Intensive Assistance, the more 
specific reason for the outcomes focus in respect to employment assistance is a 
Government view that as a ‘purchaser’ it is not well placed to judge which particular 
forms of employment assistance are most likely in any particular case to achieve the 
outcomes they have in mind. From this perspective, government control of 
outputs whether achieved through output-based contracting with an external 
provider or through directives to a government service entity must necessarily result 
in significant allocative inefficiency. Government policy-makers believe that 
employment assistance in Australia has in the past been too ‘program driven’, with 
clients at times being allocated to specific programs not because of a careful 
judgement that these were the programs most likely to be of benefit to them, but 
simply because there were places available (eg, Committee on Employment 
Opportunities, 1993). 
 
In this view, those who produce the service are in a better position to know what 
services are most likely to benefit individual clients. The challenge therefore is 
somewhat like that faced in the health sector: how does one endow service providers 
with the flexibility to tailor services while ensuring that such flexibility is not abused 
through inappropriate or excessive servicing. Outcomes-based funding is the chosen 
solution. It may be inferred that the Government believes that if those who select the 
services also pay for them, and are only remunerated for success in placing clients in 
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In 1997, Prime Minister Howard forecast that within three months of its operation, the 
FLEX scheme would be seen as an enormous success. This is not quite how things 
have worked out. At the time of writing (mid 1998), this three months has elapsed and 
FLEX is widely perceived to be in a state of acute crisis, to the great embarrassment of 
the increasingly embattled Coalition government. Job placement rates appear to be 
well down relative to the previous system (Mitchell, 1998), and many provider 
agencies appear to be on the brink of bankruptcy. The flavour of press coverage can be 
gauged from some typical headlines: ‘Anger as Jobs Scheme Problems Grow’; ‘Work 
Seekers’ Verdict on Job Network: It’s a Flop’; and ‘Job Network Agencies Struggling 
to Survive’. 
 
Job Matching services are experiencing the most immediate difficulties. Many 
agencies are complaining that remuneration for this service is quite insufficient. Client 
referrals from government are also said to be far too slow. There are, moreover, 
considerable problems arising from the termination of the previously free service for 
both employers and for the large portion of unemployed persons who are ineligible for 
government-subsidised assistance because they are not in receipt of government 
income support. 
 
Of course, with only three month’s operation, the FLEX scheme is far too new for 
definitive conclusions to be drawn. It is too new even to embark upon systematic 
survey work: this would have to wait until the scheme has settled down somewhat. 
This, however, may never happen. At the time of writing, there are indications that the 
Government, which faces an imminent election, may be on the brink of announcing 
radical changes to the scheme. It nevertheless seems useful to consider from the 
perspective of ‘first principles’ some of the problems which FLEX is currently faced 
and may be expected to face in the future. 
 
Risk and Uncertainty in a Regime of Outcome-Based Remuneration 
 
It is well recognised in the agency theory literature that, whatever the incentive effects 
of payment-by-results, a major limitation upon the use of this mode of remuneration is 
the degree of risk
9 in the relationship between an agent’s effort and the consequent 
results (eg Besanko, Dranove and Shanley, 1996: 630-633). In the case of public 
programs, the degree of risk pertaining to outcomes tends to be particularly large. 
Economic principles suggest, firstly, that to the extent that contracted service 
providers are paid for outcomes, the higher the degree of uncertainty and risk, the 
greater the (statistically) expected provider remuneration will need to be. More 
importantly, they suggest that, if providers are more risk-averse than government, it 
will not be optimal to allocate most risk to providers (Aoki, 1984). 
 
                                                 
9   ‘Risk’ is used loosely here so as to include Knightian uncertainty.   10
Job Matching outcomes are certainly subject to significant risk. There is a certain 
irreducible processing effort required for each client, yet the probability of placing 
clients in jobs is heavily dependent upon the state of the macro-economy. Uncertainty 
about rates of client referral to providers by government has also been a problem when 
there are fixed operating costs to be covered. 
 
There is, however, considerably more risk again in the effort/outcomes relationship 
for Intensive Assistance services, which are much more costly to the service provider 
than Job Matching. Every time a provider spends more on an Intensive Assistance 
client than the ‘up front’ payment it receives, it is making an investment in respect to 
which it will not even recover its costs (let alone make a profit) unless an employment 
outcome is achieved. There is significant risk concerning the prospects both of 
achieving the desired intermediate outcome of such services (eg improved client 
employability), and of then achieving the high-level outcome of a successful job 
placement. One implication of this is that, during recessions, agencies may be very 
reluctant to spend much beyond the minimum level covered by the up-front payment. 
A further implication is that, even in a more buoyant and stable macroeconomic 
environment, it is likely that there will be a sub-optimal level of expenditure on such 
assistance because provider agencies will generally be much more risk-averse than 
government. This is particularly true of non-profit providers and of smaller provider 
agencies from disadvantaged regions, both of which tend to be short on working 
capital. 
 
Providers are contractually obliged to accept and provide services to all appropriately-
referred Intensive Assistance clients. They are also required to achieve targets related 
to the demographic profile of their placements, so as to ensure that equity groups are 
adequately catered for (DEETYA, 1997b: 23). These requirements are designed to 
prevent providers from managing their risk exposure by selecting clients who are most 
easy to place and rejecting or under-servicing those with relatively poor job placement 
prospects. This exemplifies a further problem of outcomes-based remuneration which 
is perhaps unique to the public sector. In those areas where payment-by-outcome is 
employed within the private sector, service providers typically manage risk by being 
highly selective in choosing clients. A classic instance is the provision of litigation 
services on a contingency basis (‘on spec’) clients without high prospects of 
winning their court case simply cannot obtain this service. The problem is that in the 
public sector such selectivity is apt to be regarded as unacceptable ‘cream-skimming’. 
In the case of employment assistance, not only are there specific equity targets, but 
there is politically-induced ambiguity about the extent to which providers can expect 
the government to reduce their risk by at least ‘weeding out’ (subject to the equity 
targets) the hard-core unemployable individuals who have in the past constitutes such 
a problem for labour-market programs (Kelly, 1997: 345). 
 
To the extent that they are actually effective, non-price measures to prohibit cream-
skimming, such as an obligation to accept all referrals, simply increase provider risk. 
In practice, however, providers are likely to respond by minimising the services they 
provide to Intensive Assistance to clients whom they judge least likely to obtain work. 
The only constraints upon this type of behaviour appears to lie in the general 
contractual stipulation to provide a quality service, and in the requirement that the 
‘activity agreement’ be officially approved. It seems fair to predict that this approval   11
requirement may become a major stress point in the new system. One possibility is 
that it will emerge increasingly as a vehicle for the de facto re-imposition of output 
controls. 
 
An obvious price-based measure to address this problem is a differentiated outcomes 
fee structure which relates the amount of the payment to the difficulty of the case. 
FLEX in fact has such a fee structure, as did the former case management system. The 
classification of clients is, however, an unavoidably crude business. While, moreover, 
client-differentiated fees somewhat reduce the degree of risk related to variable client 
characteristics, they do nothing about other crucial dimensions of risk such as the state 
of the economy.  
 
Underlying these grave concerns about the ramifications of high levels of provider 
risk under the FLEX scheme is a more fundamental issue about the government’s 
motivation. The Coalition regards many of the labour market programs formerly 
provided by government as ineffective and wasteful. This applies particularly to wage 
subsidy programs and temporary public employment schemes (a view strongly 
challenged by recent independent research (Stromback, Dockery and Ying, 1998)). An 
interesting question is therefore whether the public rhetoric about flexibility and 
individual tailoring is a true reflection of the Government’s motivation, or whether 
perhaps the desire to see a major reduction in expenditure on these forms of assistance 
may not loom larger in the Government’s thinking. It is perhaps significant in this 
context that outputs-based funding for Job Search Training a low-cost form of 
assistance with which the Government is comfortable has been retained. 
 
Outcome Specification and Measurement Issues  
 
Given that there is necessarily much greater risk and uncertainty in the relation 
between effort and outcomes than in the relation between effort and outputs, 
outcomes-based contracting can only possibly be superior to outputs-based contracting 
if specification/measurement problems are much less severe in respect to outcome 
than in respect to outputs. Employment assistance is, in this respect at least, 
considerably more conducive to outcomes-based contracting than many other human 
services. Job placements are relatively unproblematic to measure and yet may be 
considered to be a reasonably high level outcome indicator. Notwithstanding this, they 
are not a perfect outcomes measure, and can consequently be expected to induce 
certain behavioural distortions. 
 
While to some the desired high level outcome of employment assistance to the long-
term unemployed is increased aggregate employment, many others take the view that 
employment assistance does not in general influence aggregate employment and that 
the real objective of employment assistance should in fact be labour market equity 
(Stretton and Chapman, 1990; Kirby, 1985). To the extent that equity towards specific 
disadvantaged groups within the general pool of long-term unemployed (such as 
ethnic minorities and the disabled)  is a key objective, mere numbers of job 
placements are an inadequate performance indicator. The composition of placements 
will also be important. This makes it clear that the ‘cream-skimming’ issue discussed 
above may also be viewed as an outcome specification problem. 
   12
There is a coercive element in the provision of employment assistance which is 
essentially unique to the public sector. Client co-operation with the provider is a 
precondition for the continued receipt of social security support. When providers are 
paid primarily by outcomes, there is a danger that the financial incentive to place 
client in jobs may lead to undesirable procedural outcomes, such as the pressuring of 
clients to accept jobs which are unsuitable and which they are by law entitled to refuse 
without losing government income support. Australia’s Commonwealth Ombudsman 
(1997: 2, 64-6) has described the growing incidence of ‘process corruption’ of this 
type as a result of outcomes-based remuneration of contractors, citing the former case 
management system as one of a number of problem areas. If such process corruption 
was a problem under case management, it can reasonably be expected to be even more 
of a problem under the FLEX system, where the incentives to achieve placements are 
so much greater. The rather general injunctions against such behaviour in a new Code 




This case study of employment assistance privatisation is illustrative of the manner in 
which recent Australian public sector practice in government service privatisation and 
outsourcing more generally has tended to be dominated by the simple ‘pure market’ 
model. Yet in the presence of major performance specification/measurement 
problems, or given other forms of asset specificity (in particular, human asset 
specificity), this mode of contracting may be quite inappropriate. As the OECD (1993, 
p 92) noted in its recent report on the use of market-type mechanisms within the 
public sector: 
 
In the private sector, contractual relationships run the full gamut from “pure 
market” (ie arms length transactions for very specific jobs, making repeated and 
maximum use of competition to obtain the best prices) to partnerships with 
suppliers involving a lot of trust, sophisticated harmonisation procedures, wide 
sharing of information, relatively long-term commitments cemented by client-
specific investments, mutual shareholdings, and so on. Somewhat paradoxically, 
standard [public sector] procedures in most countries tend to locate the options 
of contract managers to the “pure market” end of the spectrum .... 
 
For many government service, contracting based upon outputs raises significant 
quality measurement problems. In addition, in instances of significant information 
asymmetry, it may be quite undesirable for central government authorities to 
determine which specific outputs are to be provided. In the case of employment 
assistance, the Australian government has attempted to overcome these problems by 
weighting outcomes very heavily in provider remuneration under the FLEX scheme. 
However even though the measure of high-level employment assistance outcomes 
which has been used for this purpose is much less imperfect than are outcome 
measures for many other public programs, the extent of this emphasis upon outcomes 
has been the source of enormous program difficulties. The primary reason for this is 
the considerable risk and uncertainty governing the relationship between provider 
effort and high-level outcomes. These problems are so severe that, at time of writing, 
it appears likely that the government will radically revise the FLEX scheme after only 
a few months of operation.   13
 
This is not, of course, to suggest that some element of outcomes-based remuneration 
may not often be a desirable feature of contracting for privatised government service 
provision. Outcome-based performance bonuses, for example, are often a useful 
mechanism. However, it is important that provider risk be kept to acceptable levels. In 
the case of employment assistance, one potentially attractive strategy might have been 
to maintain the former case manager/service provider distinction, while making case 
managers ‘fund-holders’. This would have meant giving case managers substantial 
power to allocate government (rather than their own) funds to purchases services their 
clients. Such an approach would have given case managers considerably for more 
control over the outputs provided to their clients, while greatly moderating the degree 
of provider risk exposure inherent in the outcomes component of provider 
remuneration. However, it is not yet possible to state with confidence that privatised 
service provision on this or some other model is in fact superior to internal 
government provision. 
 
In Australia at least, there is a need for considerably more thought to be given to 
appropriate contracting models and, more generally, to the full range of relevant 
criteria for selecting between internal production and outsourcing. The ‘pure market’ 
model is clearly dangerously limited. It is, for example, quite wrong to think that 
outsourcing is only appropriate when it is possible to structure a ‘competitive’ market 
in which a significant number of potential providers compete via tender in the manner 
of a textbook model of perfect competition. Outsourcing may potentially be useful 
even under circumstances such as bilateral monopoly, for reasons which are not made 
explicit by the competitive tendering model. On the other hand, outsourcing may be 
entirely undesirable even when multiple service providers are willing to compete for 
the business. What is necessary is that public policy makers leave behind simplistic 
textbook notions of the manner in which ‘markets’ work, and develop a more 
sophisticated appreciation of the range of potential modes of contracting from which 
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